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Abstract: This paper deals with similarities and differences between new economic sociology (NES) 
and new institutional economics (NIE). We start with brief reports on the basic ideas of NES and NIE. 
Regarding the latter, we concentrate on NIE in the sense of Oliver Williamson who introduced t e 
term and whose work became the main target of sociologists’ critique. We show that the contrast 
between the two fields is less sharp than some social scientists might assume. We then present a 
review and assessment of the attack of seven sociologists on Oliver Williamson’s ideas. The 
sociologists are Perrow, Fligstein, Freeland, Granovetter, Bradach & Eccles, and Powell. Their 
battering ram “social network theory” is briefly described and an attempt made to combine network 
analysis with new institutional economics as understood by Williamson, i.e., his transaction cost 
economics. The paper is concluded with some thoughts on the convergence of NES and NIE.
 
 
 
1. Introductory Remarks 
This paper deals with similarities and differences between the Ne  EconomicSociology 
(NES) and the New Institutional Economics (NIE). As we shall see, both deal with social 
actions. What are then the differences between the two fields – the fundamental 
                                          
1 I benefited from detailed comments by Mark Granovetter, Richard Swedberg, and Oliver E. Williamson. 
The usual disclaimer applies.  
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differences that is – or are there essentially none?
According to Smelser and Swedberg (1994b, 4) there are considerable differences at least 
between classical sociology and classical economics:  
· in sociology actors are influenced by other actors, 
· in economics actors are uninfluenced by other actors. 
But at a closer look, the contrast between the two fields is less sharp. Economists since 
Cournot (1838) know and recognize analytically that “actors are influenced by other 
actors.” But classical economists, being obsessed with the goal of efficiency (Pareto 
efficiency that is), disliked oligopolies. They do not take them for granted. They wanted 
to annihilate them politically and to establish in the real world conditions “as if” we 
would have perfct competition. It is this ideal-typical view of classical economics that 
has been challenged, among others, by NIE in the sense of Oliver Williamson. 
A deeper difference between classical sociology and classical economics exists with 
regard to their respctive models of man: 
· sociologists allow for various types of human action, including rational action; 
· economists assume only perfect rationality. (Smelser and Swedberg 1994b, 4) 
More precisely, perfect individual rationality is the fundamental assumption of 
neoclassical microeconomics. It was challenged by Simon (1957), whose concept of 
bounded rationality was introduced by Williamson as an important element into his NIE 
(Williamson 1975). North, in his later work, seems to go even further. He states that  
“a modification of these [rational choice] assumptions is essential to further progress in the social 
sciences. The motivation of the actors is more complicated (and their preferences less stable) than 
assumed in received theory.” (North 1990, 17) 
With the development of NIE, economists deeply infiltrated sociologists’ territory and 
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sociologists, understandably, rose in arms. They lined up to a counter attack under the 
banner of New Economic Sociology (NES). It was started in the 1980s at Harvard by 
former students of Harrison White, among them Robert Eccles (1981), Mark Granovetter 
(1985), Michael Schwartz. Independently of the Harvard group, several other sociologists 
joined battle, among them Mitchel Abolafia (1984), Susan Shapiro (1984), Viviana 
Zelizer (1983). Their objective was to attack economists “by elaborating the sociological 
viewpoint as forcefully as possible.” (Granovetter and Swedberg 1992, 7) 
The number of studies in economic sociology exploded during the following years as 
illustrated by the review article of Baron and Hannan (1994), the Handbook of Economic 
Sociology edited by Smelser and Swedberg (1994a, a new edition being in preparation) 
or the bibliography of the recently established “Economic Sociology Section” of the 
American Sociological Society.2 Sociologists rediscovered their old object of research, 
“institutions”, and developed their own brand of new institutionalism. (Powell and 
DiMaggio 1991, 1 ff., Brinton and Nee 1998, 1 ff.)  
Not amazingly, the overlap between the syllabi of gr duate courses in economic 
sociology and issues of the New Institutional Economics became remarkable (cf. James 
Montgomery3). Are the two fields growing together? 
They should, writes Granovetter (2001, 1). Economists and sociologists should build a 
unified theory on what they have accomplished. This is an old dream of Max Weber’s, a 
                                          
2 ”Economic Sociology Section in Formation”, Mission Statement (21.12.2000),  
see http://uci.edu/econsoc/mission.html 
3 Associate Professor of sociology, University of Wisconsin, College of Letters and Scienc , Gra uate 
course Sociology 651: Economic Sociology I, see http://www.gsm.uci.edu/econsoc/Aspersbiblio.html. 
Professor Montgomery demands from his students the preparation of a personal handbook on topics 
which virtually all are subjects of the New Institutional Economics as, e.g., shown in Furubotn&Richter 
(1997). 
ISNIE2001/Revise~2.doc  7/17/01 5
continuation of the views of Gustav Schmoller, whom Schumpeter (1926, 355) described 
as the “father” of American institutionalism. These views were thoroughly destroyed by 
the German battle of methods (Methodenstreit) opened by Carl Menger (1883/ 96).4 
Menger’s opinion of the “true methodology” of economics, i.e., neoclassical 
microeconomics, became the dominant methodological position among mainstream 
economists. Is this still the case? We don’t think so. There has been a change in 
economics since Coase (1937, 1960) and the development of modern institutional 
economics. 
We shall continue as follows: We shall start with a brief report on the basic ideas first of 
New Economic Soci logy and then New Institutional Economics. As for the latter, we 
shall concentrate on NIE in the sense of Oliver Williamson who introduced the term. 
(Williamson 1975, 1) Next, we shall report on representatives of NES fighting Oliver 
Williamson’s ideas. Their battering ram “social network theory” will be briefly described 
and an attempt made to combine network analysis with new institutional economics as 
understood by Williamson. The paper will be concluded with some thoughts on the 
convergence of NES and NIE. 
 
2. Basic Ideas of New Economic Sociology (NES)
According to Smelser and Swedberg (1994b, 18) NES covers many of the substantive 
areas of old economic sociology. But there are also a number of new directions. Their 
theoretical approaches are fundametally clectic and pluralistic. No single perspective is 
dominant. The influence of Weber (1922, 1968) and Parsons (1937) can be seen, also that 
                                          
4 Swedberg (1990, 34) 
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of Polanyi (1944). Some representatives of NES are attracted by the critique of capitalism 
like Mintz and Schwartz (1985). More interesting, however, is the concept of 
“embeddedness” as used by Granovetter in the sense that “economic action takes place 
within the networks of social relations that make up the social structure.” DiMaggio 
(1990) adds that economic action is embedded not only in social structure but also in 
culture. Points of interest are the sociology of markets (Barber 1977, Adler and Adler 
1984, Mintz and Schwartz 1985, Burt 1982), the sociology of the firm and industrial 
organization with topics like investor capitalism (Useem 1996); the critiqu  of transaction 
cost economics (Granovetter 1985, Fligstein 1985, Perrow 1981, u.a.), the sociology of 
industrial regions (Saxenian 1994).  
What are the most prominent concepts of new economic sociology? That is no easy 
question to answer for an economist. We shall try our best, following Max Weber’s 
(1968) line of thought. 
Some preparatory remarks 
As mentioned above, sociological concepts are targeted on social action, “which ... may 
be oriented to past, present or future behavior of others.” (Weber 1968, 22) Interestingly, 
the reference point is, for Weber, the same as for neoclassical economists – the ideal type 
of a “purely rational course of action ... which has the merit of clear understandability and 
lack of ambiguity.5 By comparison with this it is possible to understand the ways in 
which actual action is ifluenced by irrational factors ...” (ibid.). 
In other words, Weber used as reference point the zero transaction cost world with perfect 
                                          
5 This is complicated, though, by Weber’s (1968, 85 – 86) distinction between “formal rationality” and 
“substantive rationality”. Swedberg (1998, 36) reads this so that according to Max Weber “value-oriented 
action can be just as rational as formal economic reasoning.” 
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individual rationality, a benchmark strongly opposed by representatives of NIE (cf. 
Furubotn and Richter 1997, 445). Demsetz (1968) coined the term “nirvana approach” for 
such comparisons.  
Sociologists, as economists, deal with empirical uniformities or laws, but related only to 
social actions. “Sociological investigation is concerned with these typical modes of 
action.” (Weber 1968, 29) The existence of such “typical modes of action”(hypotheses, 
laws) enables us to predict or explain social phenomena, that is, to logically derive them 
from other known social phenomena. 
An economist is tempted to translate the analytic methods of economic sociology into the 
analytic methods of economics. Economists tend to reduce their concepts to rational 
choice theory. Concepts without such a “micro-foundation”, like the Keynesian absolute 
income hypothesis, are in eco omese “ad hoc.” Thus, old Keynesian macroeconomics is 
“ad hoc,” while Neokeynesians try to clear Keynesianism of their bad name by 
developing “micro foundations” of old Keynesian hypotheses. Economists assume 
perfect individual rationality to which they try to reduce all social phenomena including 
power or trust.6 Sociologists, instead, have a broader view; they dislike this 
“reductionism” and tend to regard phenomena like power or trust as fundamental parts of 
their theoretical constructions. Thus, what looks ad h c to an economist may be a basic 
axiom for a sociologist.  
                                          
6 A common ground on which to base “trust” and “rational action” might be the more general concept of 
“motives of human actions.” It include contrasts like egoistic and altruistic behavior. Thus the old German 
“institutionalist” Schmoller (1900, 33) writes: “We must concede that economic behavior of today and 
probably of all times is closely related with self-interest”…. “Yet to find out the truth it will be necessary to 
go a step further .. [and] … to analyze psychologically and historically, … , the basic motives of economic 
actions [die Triebfedern des wirtschaftlichen Handelns  überhaupt]. … “The classical theory of economics 
[Schmoller calls it d eTheorie der natürlichen Volkswirtschaft] is, in toto, based on an incomplete analysis 
of man...” (1900, 92). North (1990, 17) argues similarly as quoted at the beginning of this paper (see also 
Richter 1996, 574). 
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Nevertheless, Max Weber (1968, 9) distinguishes between “sociological mass 
phenomena, the average of, or an approximation to, the actual meaning” and “the 
meaning appropriate to a scientifi ally formulated pure type (an ideal type) of a common 
phenomenon.”7 The first corresponds, in the language of economists, to an ad hoc 
reasoning the second, in the terminology of sociologists, to a “reductionist” view. Still, 
average regularities in human behavior need not be reduced to the axioms of individual 
rationality. They could also be reduced to other underlying principles like neuro-
biological, socio-biological, social-psychological etc. laws. Economists, born 
reductionists, are becoming increasingly aware of such alternatives to pure rational 
choice (see, e.g., Robson 2001). Nevertheless, in the following we’ll disregard any kind 
of “reductionism” and concentrate, in the language of economists, on sociological 
concepts of the “ad hoc” type, i.e., as not further reduced “givens”.  
Some fundamental sociological concepts of NES 
We choose the following three NES concepts8 by understanding them to be (in above 
sense) ad hoc assumptions:  
(1) Economic Action as Social Action: 
“Economic action is seen only as a special, if important, category of social action.” 
(Granovetter 1992, 76) Economic relations between two parties can be of different 
character: implicit or explicit; hierarchical or among equals, mutually binding contractual 
relations with freely chosen partners (according to the principle of freedom of contract) or 
power relationships (dominance and compliance), reciprocal or one-sided, based on trust 
                                          
7 Cf. Coleman (1990, 13) uses the same “purposive theory of action.” 
8 Leaning on Swedberg and Granovetter (1992, 1 – 26), Weber (1968), Nee(1998, 1 – 16). 
ISNIE2001/Revise~2.doc  7/17/01 9
or burdened by distrust etc. 
(2) Embeddedness of Social Action 
Social actions are constrained by ongoing social relations and cannot be explained by 
reference to individual motives alone. (Granovetter 1992, 53) They are “embedded” in 
ongoing networks of personal reltionships, economic and non-economic, rather than 
being carried out by atomized actors. The embeddedness concept can be described by 
social network analysis. 
(3) The Social Construction of Economic Institutions 
Real world institutions are rarely the result of games of pure coordination in which agents 
interests coincide perfectly, they are seldom the work of an “invisible hand” as in David 
Hume’s or Carl Menger’s famous examples. They are mostly mixtures of conflict and 
coordination, of opposing and coinciding nterests. (Lewis 1969, 14) Sociologists 
therefore understand institutions to be “social constructions”9, i.e., the product of visible 
hands. Thus, e.g., there is no “invisible hand” behind the creation of a market but a sharp 
struggle of inter sts (Swedberg and Granovetter 1992, 17). Further, institutions need not 
be the result of [purely] rational choice. The way to develop institutions may be by trial 
and error, which may be understood as a form of boundedly rational action. Another form
may be habitualized actions which precede any institutionalization. (Berger and Luckm  
1966, 53) 
Path dependency of institutions matters, not necessarily efficiency. The most efficient 
solution does not always win out as illustrated by the famous, though questionable, 
                                          
9 Swedberg and Granovetter (1992, 16). 
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QUERTY example (David 1986, but Liebowitz and Margolis 1990, Williamson 1996, 
242). Scott (1994, 78) points out that “Economists, political scientists, and sociologi ts 
productively debate the uses and limits of rational choice; and some economists have
begun to wonder whether rule-d iv n behavior may not have its [boundedly] rational 
aspects.” Hamilton and Biggart (1988/1992, 182) emphasize the cultural vi w of 
organizations: “... industrial ent rprise is a complex modern adaptation of preexisting 
patterns of domination to economic situations in which profit, efficiency, and control 
usually form the very conditions of exitence.” 
 
3. Basic Ideas of New Institutional Economics 
The term “New Institutional Economics” was introduced by Williamson (1975, 1) in his 
book on Markets and Hierarchies. It became soon a catchword for the economic analysis 
of institutions in general.10 After some additions, Williamson called later his version of 
NIE “transaction cost economics”, or shortly TCE (cf. Williamson 1979, 1985). There are 
many more representatives of this kind of analysis but it is mainly Williamson’s style of 
reasoning, which challenged sociologists most vehemently. We shall therefore 
concentrate on the comparison of Williamson’s NIE with NES, starting with a br ef 
review of the basic ideas of Oliver Williamson’s older and newer versions of the New 
Institutional Economics. 
What became transaction cost economics was developed stepwise in a series of articles 
                                          
10 In Furubotn and Richter (1997), e.g., we understand NIE as a mix of property rights analysis, transaction 
cost economics, and contract theory.
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published roughly between 1971 and 1985.11 These articles were published and rounded 
off in Williamson’s two books Markets and Hierarchies of 1975 and The Economic 
Institutions of Capitalism of 1985. Williamson’s claims are bold: “Contrary to earlier 
conceptions – where the economic institutions of capitalism are explained by reference to 
class interest, technology, and/or mon poly power – the transaction-cost approach 
maintains that these institutions have the main purpose and effect of economizing on 
transaction costs.” (Williamson 1985, 1). To sociologists, born skeptics of efficiency 
considerations, this view was like a red rag to a bull. 
The main thrust of his two books may be sketched as follows. 
The Markets and Hierarchies Approach to Economic Organization: Williamson (1975) 
Williamson’s markets and hierarchies approach concerns social actions, underlining the 
affinity of his theory to sociology. The unit of analysis is the transac ion understood as a 
bilateral or dyadic relation. Its execution causes transaction costs part of which are 
transactions specifi  investments (asset specificity). Transaction costs are related with 
incomplete information (uncertainty) and with the limits of human cognitive abilities – in 
sum: with bounded rationality. Specific investments and incomplete information invite 
opportunism. Court ordering is partly ineffective and has to be complemented or even 
substi uted by private ordering through internal organization (hierarchy). 
Chapter 8 of Williamson (1975) deals with the transition of the organizational form of 
large enterprises from the unitary form (U-form) to a multidivisional structure (M-form). 
The chapter relates to Williamson (1967, 1970) and Williamson and Bhargava (1972),   
which are largely based on the “control loss phenomenon” (1967, 129). Transaction costs 
                                          
11 Williamson himself outlined his scientific journey of discovery in Williamson (1996, Ch. 14). 
ISNIE2001/Revise~2.doc  7/17/01 12
are not mentioned. Central argument is the advantage of the M-form relative to the U-
form but Williamson lists als, textbook style, five “characteristics and advantages of the 
M-form innovation” (1975, 137). Among these are the division between operating and 
strategic decisions, the first “assigned to (essentially self-contain d) operating divisions”, 
the latter “principally” to the general office. The M-form would be “corrupted” when the 
general management involves in the operating affairs (1975, 148). This contention 
became later an easy target of sociologists’ critique12.  
The Transaction Cost Approach to Economic Organization: Williamson (1985) 
The term “transaction cost economics” as name for a new type of economics was first 
mentioned in Williamson (1979). The conc pts used are the same as in Williamson 
(1975) plus two more, the concepts of fundamental transformation nd of relational 
contracts. These two additional concepts together with the main ideas of Williamson’s 
TCE may be reviewed as follows: 
Non-standard contracts need not result from monopolistic practices. The reason is that 
transaction specific investments can play an essential role after the conclusion of a 
contract. Williamson illustrates this by use of his concept of fundamental 
transformation:13 After contract conclusion the parties find themselves locked into a 
bilateral monopoly situation, whereas before they were free to choose with whom to 
trade. Transaction specific investments of whatever kind (if only in form of time invested 
in search, inspection, and bargaining) are the reason for this transformation. In addition, 
the parties don’t know what the future will bring. Under uncertainty it is impossible to 
                                          
12 Notably by Freeland (1996a). 
13 Which clarifies his ”ex post small numbers exchange relation” (Williamson 1975, 29). Alchian suggested 
to call it the “Williamson transform.” (Alchian 1987, 233) 
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write a complete contract that details all possible future contingencies. Contracts, in 
particular longer term contracts, remain unavoidably incomplete or “relational”, i.e., the 
relationship between the parties mat er . The problem is that the lock-in f the parties, in 
combination with information costs or generally transaction costs, may invite 
opportunistic behavior (a “hold up”) of the other side. Due to transaction costs the parties 
have difficulties or are unable to verify th ir case to a third party (e.g., a court). Thus, 
court ordering may have to be supplemented or even substituted by priva e ordering to 
effectively protect the parties against opportunism of their trade partners. There exist 
various ways to organize the governance structure of a contractual relationship, not only 
markets and hierarchies.14 Their efficacy depends on particular circumstances, inter alia, 
the size of specific investments and the frequency of transactions between he parties. 
Discussion: Williamson’s new “1985” version of NIE, his TCE, is a theory of bilateral 
contracts under conditions of uncertainty and asymmetric information where legal 
enforcement and self enforcement complement one another. Both, court ordering and 
private ordering, characterize the governance structure (or “organization”) of non-
standard contractual relationships. Attentive actors agree bef e they come to terms on a 
governance structure that they regard suitable. Market and hierarchy are two of the 
imaginable ideal types in a n-dimensional space of possible governance structures. It is 
important to see that the choice of an efficient (better: “efficacious”) governance structure 
results not from optimizing some target function subje  to a set of constraints. It should 
rather be understood as a form of boundedly rational or “suitable” choice from a set of 
governance structures in the sense of Selten’s hypothesis of the casuistic structure of 
                                          
14 Williamson later adds hybrid modes “located between market and hierarchy with respect to incentives, 
adaptability, and bureaucratic costs.” (Williamson 1996, 107) 
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boundedly rational strategies (see Furubotn and Richter 1997, 165) or – earlier -  
Alchian’s (1950, 218) argument “that modes of behavior replace optimum conditions as 
guiding rules of action.” 15 Which governance structure the parties choose depends on the 
existing situation. To be chosen is the governance structure with the higher probability of 
survival. The problem for the parties then is to agree on both the “right” diagnosis and the 
relative “best” cure (governance structure). Williamson’s (1985, 79) table of “efficient 
governance”, where he suggests four types of governance structures or his later 
distinction between “market, hybrid, hierarchy” (1996, 117), is to be understood as an 
example of how to think, not an aswer to the parties’ actual decision problem.  
Note that TCE, as described above, is concerned with the governance structure of strictly 
dyadic relations. Yet, in real life, as Granovetter (1985) pointed out, actors are embedded 
in complex networks of contractual relationships (rights of disposition), formal and 
informal ones. Thus, an application of the TCE approach to network analysis might be of 
interest. Williamson (1993, 56) concedes: 
“Transaction cost economics mainly works out a dyadic set-up. Albeit adequate and instructive 
for studying many complex transactions, provision for larger numbers of actors and interaction is 
sometimes needed.” 
 
4. The Attack of New Economic Sociologists on Transaction Cost Economics 
As mentioned above, sociologists’ critique centers largely on Williamson (1975), viz., on 
the contrast between markets and hierarchies, or on the assumption of a continuum 
                                          
15 “Like the biologist, the economist predicts the effects of environmental changes on the surviving class of 
living organisms; the economist need not assume that each participant is aware of, or acts according to, 
his cost and demand situation.” (Alchian 1950, 220 f.)  
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between the extremes of markets and hierarchies.16 We shall briefly report and discuss 
the critical comments by seven proponents of NES: Perrow (1981, 1986), Fligstein 
(1985), Granovetter (1985), Bradach & Eccles (1989), Powell (1990), and Freeland 
(1996).  
Perrow (1986, 236) criticizes Williamson’s argument “... that efficiency is the main and 
only systematic fa tor responsible for the organizational changes [to giant organizations] 
that have occurred.”17 In Perrow’s view, Williamson ignores the uses of power in shaping 
behavior both inside and outside the organization and oversimplifies the motivational 
complexity leading to different social arrangements. (Perrow 1986, 247) Rather, the 
reasons for firms to become big would be quite diverse, saving on transaction costs might 
be only of modest importance (248).  
Discussion: Williamson and Ouchi (1981, 388) replied to the power argument that 
“vertical integration knows no limits. In quest for power, integrate everything.” This  
would be a refutable implication, contradicted by the facts. “Selective rather than 
comprehensive vertical integration is predicted by the transac ion cost approach.” 
(loc.cit., 389) Over time only integration moves that have better rationality properties 
would tend to have better survival properties (ibid.). As for the rest, Williamson (1996, 
238 ff.) argues, power is a diffuse and vaguely defined conc pt.18 Of the various forms of 
power at most resource dependency would be distinctive to organization theory (and 
TCE). But it assumes myopic contracts, i.e. contracts without sufficient ex ante 
safeguards against ex post opportunism (Williamson 1996, 239) while TCE “regards 
                                          
16 Powell (1986, 255), Bradach and Eccles (1989, 101). 
17 Williamson (1986, 125) as quoted by Perrow (1986, 237). 
18 See also Williamson (1995, 32 ff.). 
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dependency very differently because it works out of a farsighted rather than myopic 
contract perspective.” (Williamson 1995, 35)  
Fligstein (1985) compares various theories of what causes the change of organization of 
enterprise from the unitary form (U-form) to a multidivisional structure (M-form), 
among them the transaction cost analysis. According to Williamson (1975), the M-form 
is a consequence of cumulative “control loss” effects with increasing size due to 
transaction costs, bounded rationality and opportunism. 
Fligstein (1985, 382) tests the various theories on the basis of the lists of the 100 largest 
firms by asset size and finds that Williamson’s argument is not “an important 
explanation” of the genesis of the M-form. Organizational change does not imply that the 
most important organizational problems are being solved. Instead, Fligstein advances the 
theory that actors are first constructing an organizational problem, then claim to be able 
to solve it, and finally, in order to do so, have to be in the position to implement their 
proposed solutions. In other words, they must be key actors whose strategic bases of 
power are consistent with the proposed organizational form (386). “In the end, the actions 
of key actors may or may not work to preserve the organization.” (1985, 388 f.)  
Fligstein later clarifies that his model of action should not be mistaken for the model of 
perfectly rational or boundedly rational actors of economic theory. Rather, “actors are 
assumed to construct rationales for their behavior on the basis of how they view the 
world. Their goals and strategies result from those views and are not the product of an 
abstract rationality. The construction of courses of action depends greatly on the position 
of actors within the structure of the organization, which forms the interests and identities 
of actors.” (Fligstein 1990, 11)  
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Discussion: Fligstein’s view comes close to the power argument by Pfeffer (1981) and 
Perrow (1970, 1981). He argues that “actors must have some resource base either within 
the organization or the environment whereby they have the pow r to enforce their 
solution in the organization.” (Fligstein 1985, 388) Insofar as resource dependency is the 
source of power, Williamson’s (1996, 238 ff.) counterarguments apply. They are quoted 
above. The comparative character of Williamson’s argument, that the M-form “favors 
goal pursuit and least-co  behavior more…than does the U-form organizational 
alternative” (Williamson 1975, 150) is disregarded or takes second place. 
Freeland (1996) doubts that the M-form succeeded because it reduced costs by creating a 
clear distinction between strategic and tactical planning. He supports his view by a 
paradigmatic case study of General Motors between 1924 and 1958. “For most of its 
history, GM intentionally violated the axioms of efficient organization to create 
managerial consent… The textbook M-f rm may actually undermine order within the 
firm, thus leading to organizational decline.” (1996, 483) --- “Although TCE makes the 
problem of order central to organizational analysis, the resolution that it offers is fraught 
with difficulties.” (487)  
Discussion: Freeland calls the target of his critic “TCE,” though Williamson developed 
TCE only in 1979 ff.. De facto, Freeland criticizes Williamson’s earlier work of 1967, 
1970 and 1972, which is based, as was mentioned above, on the control-l ss phenomenon 
(Williamson 1967, 123). The term “transaction cost” does here not appear, let alone 
transaction cost economics. Freeland could have mentioned that in his critic. In its 
substance, Freeland’s criticism tends to be somewhat sophistical. Williamson develops 
expressis verbis h  arguments for the M-form relative to the U-form. Of course, 
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voluntary acceptance of an order (i.e., its legitimacy) is vital for its functioning. But that 
includes a broad range of control techniques of a hierarchy from strict fiat (e.g., military 
command structures) to utmost participative decentralization (e.g., a extreme cases of 
codetermination). The most effective type of voluntary acceptance of an order, if there is 
one, depends probably on ruling circumstances. Williamson did not analyze this issue, 
neither did Freeman (1996).   
Granovetter (1985, 1995) wrote, according to Hamilton and Feenstra (1995, 56), the 
most important critique of Williamson’s NIE. His critique also centers on Williamson 
(1975). Granovetter argues that Williamson’s appeal to authority relations “in order to 
tame opportunism” constitutes a rediscovery of Hobbesian analysis, an over-emph sizing 
of hierarchical power. The ‘market’ would resemble Hobbes’s state of nature. “It is [in 
the end] the atomized and anonymous market of classical political economy, ...” 
(Granovetter 1995, 224). Instead, “the anonymous market of neoclassical models i  
virtually nonexistent in economic life and ... transactions of all kinds are rife with ... 
social connections ... This is not necessarily more the case in transactions between firms 
than within ...” (1995, 217). Williamson’s dyadic approach disregards the individual’s 
embeddedness in a social network and its effect on the creation of trust (Granovetter 
1995, 200). In real life, all business relationships are mixed up with general social 
relationships (1995, 237). Williamson “vastly overestimates the efficacy of hierarchical 
power ... within his organizations.” (1995, 220) Granovetter stresses the role of social 
structure and claims that 
“... order and disorder, honesty and malfeasance have more to do with structures of such 
relations than they do with organizational form.” (1995, 236) 
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Discussion: Nee and Ingram (1998, 22) criticize Granovetter’s embeddedness argument. 
They argue that his focus on personal relationships would introduce an element of 
indeterminacy into economic sociology as an explanatory program of research. “We do 
not know ex ante whether, and to what extent, personal ties can cement trust between 
economic actors” (ibid.). The axiom “never lend money to a friend” illustrates the point 
(1998, 23). “In the absence of a reliable third-party enforcer there is often no firm basis 
for deciding whether an acquaintance or friend is trustworthy. That is why the new 
institutionalists among economists argue that formal institutional arrangements and their 
enforcement are necessary to back informal constraints in modern economies where the 
payoff from malfeasance and opportunism is high ...” (1998, 23). Instead, Nee and 
Ingram favor social exchange theory in which norms and (boundedly) rational choice are 
of paramount importance.19 They try to build a fully integrated model of institutions, 
embeddeness and group performance (1998, 3 ff.). 
Williamson asks in his reply to Granovetter’s arguments: More sophisticated analyses 
must be judged by their value added. “What are the deeper insights? What are the added 
implications? Are the effects in question really beyond the reach of economizing 
reasoning?” (1984, 85, 1996, 230). In a later reaction, Williamson (2000, 596 ff.) writes 
(in effect) that he and Granovetter are talking at cross-purpose . The embeddedness 
concept20 is located on a higher, more general level than his TCE approach; 
embeddedness is taken as given by the representatives of the NIE. Granovetter would 
doubt that. An application of TCE to network analysis may clear that issue. It may 
                                          
19 “... we do not see humans as hyperrational – as does neoclassical economics – pos essing perfect 
information and unbounded cognitive capacity.” (Nee and Ingram 1998, 30) 
20 Embeddedness is defined by Williamson as “informal institutions, customs, traditions, norms, religion.” 
(Williamson 2000, 597, Fig. 1, first box) 
ISNIE2001/Revise~2.doc  7/17/01 20
analgamate Williamson’s demand for “deeper insights” with Granovetter’s claim that his 
concept of embeddedness constitutes any less of a theoretical argument than TCE. As 
mentioned above, Williamson (1993, 56) himself concedes that “provision for larger 
numbers of actors and interaction is sometimes needed.” We’ll take up this issue further 
below.  
 
Bradach and Eccles (1989) emphasize, as did Perrow (1986) before, that the ideal type 
of markets and hierarchies is not a mutually exclusive control mechanism, as poles of a 
continuum with “hybrid modes”21 located in between. Rather, price mechanisms are also 
installed in hierarchies (Eccles 1985) and markets contain hierarchical elements as well 
(Stinchcombe 1975, Perrow 1986). Actors may also use different governance s ructures 
for the same type of transaction with different partners, e.g., frachi e units nd own units 
or a company may make and buy an intermediate product. Bradach and Eccles (1989, 112 
ff.) call this “plural forms”22 and hypothesize “that in many cases either mechanism will 
work and that the choice of mechanism is primarily a function of the vagaries of 
circumstance – ...” (1989, 115). Plural forms may be, at least in part, driven by senior 
management’s recognition of the indirect control afforded by th m. 
Bradach and Eccles critizise TCE also by arguing that “mutual dependence between 
exchange partners … [promotes] trust [which] contrasts sharply with argument central to 
the transaction cost economics that … dependence … fosters opportunistic behavior.” 
(1989, 111) 
                                          
21 As in Williamson (1985, 83; 1991, 280; 1996, 117). 
22 They provide many real life examples. 
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Discussion: Markets and hierarchies can be easily understood as a two-dimensional mix 
(Fig. 1). It could also be generalized to a mix of higher dimensions as, e.g., three 
dimensions: markets, hybrid modes, hierarchies (Williamson 1996, 117). Thus, in the 
first case, less market does not necessarily mean more hierarchy, or in the second case, all 
sorts of combinations of markets, hierarchies and hybrid modes are imaginable - also 
“plural” modes. What matters in TCE is the choice of an efficientgov rnance struc ure, 
of “economizing.” It is to be understood as a boundedly rational (“casuistic”) choice from 
a set of possible governance structures under given circumstances (see above, Section 3). 
The parties have to agree on both the “right” interpretation of circumstances and the 
“best” suiting governance struture.  
Hierarchy 
1 
 
 
  
 
possible 
 governance 
 structures 
 
 
    1 
 Market 
 
Figure 1: Two-dimensional space of possible governance structures; here: market and hierarchy, 1 = 
ideal types. 
 
As for the argument by Bradach and Eccles, that “mutual dependence between exchange 
partners … [promotes] trust” not opportunistic behavior, Williamson (1996, 260) replies 
that “because opportunistic agents will not self-enf rce open- ded promises … efficient 
exchange will be realized only if dependencies are supported by credible commitments. 
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… Indeed, I maintain that trust is irrelevant to commercial exchange and that reference to 
trust in this connection promotes confusion.” 
Powell (1990) introduces networks as a distinctive form of coordinating economic 
activity. He recurs to high tech start-ups in the United States and Europe, which do not 
follow the standard model of small firms by developing internally through an incremental 
and linear process but by an entirely different model: “An externally-driven growth in 
which preexisting networks of relationships enable small firms to gain an established 
foothold almost overnight.” (1990, 300 f.) Powell doubts that “the bulk of economic 
exchange fits comf rtably at either of the poles of the market–hie archy continuum” and 
that the mixed mode [hybrid form] is particularly helpful (1990, 298). This would be a 
too quiescent and mechanical idea that fails to capture the complex realities of exchange. 
“By sticking to the twin pillars of markets and hierarchies, our attention is deflected from 
a diversity of organiz tional designs that are neither fish nor fowl, nor some hybrid, but 
are distinctly different forms.” (1990, 299) 
Powell illustrates his argument by three t pes of network forms: 
1. craft industries, like construction, publishing, film, and recording industries; 
2. regional economies and industrial districts, like German textiles or the Silicon 
Valley; 
3. strategic alliances and partnerships, as common in particular in technology-
intensive industries.  
Powell (1990, 323) claims that Williamson’s focus on the transaction as the primary unit 
of analysis, rather than the (social) relationship, is misplaced. As the rationale for 
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network forms Powell emphasizes three facto s: know-how, speed and trust (1990, 324 
f.). He concludes that “certain kinds of institutional contexts, that is, particular 
combinations of legal, political, and economic factors, are especially conducive to 
network arrangements ...” (1990, 326). They involv  a distinctive combination of factors: 
“skilled labor, some degree of employment security, salaries rather than piece rates, some 
externally-provided mechanisms for job training, relative equity among the participants, a 
legal system with relaxed antitrust standards, and national policies that promote research 
and development and encourage linkages between centers of higher learning and industry 
– which seldom exist in sufficient measure without a political and legal infrastructure to 
sustain them.” (1990, 326 f.)
Discussion: Obviously all organizations – al o markets and hierarchies – can be described 
as networks. The concept of social networks is of a higher level than the concepts of 
markets and hierarchies – or of “hybrid modes”. Thus, it is hard to un erstand why 
Powell (1990) or Grabher (1993) call networks a tertiumin relation to markets and 
hierarchies. Nohria (1992, 12) excuses Powell’s argument as a rhetorical strategy to get 
beyond the market and hierarchy distinction “that has become the dominant frame of the 
comparative analysis of organizations”. It is an attempt to center attention on the 
distinctive “logic of collective action [in networks] that enables cooperation to be 
sustained over the long run.” Still, classical economists would disfavor the concept of 
markets as social networks for normative reasons. For them, the idea would smell of 
collusion. In the ideal type of a competitive market buyers and sellers remain anonymous. 
There exist no social networks (social structures), no customer relationships, no interfirm 
alliances, which in the real world with transaction costs play such an important role. In 
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the world with transaction costs, though, the situation is different. There may be 
efficiency arguments for markets as networks. Larson (1992), using the social network 
concept, examines highly cooperative interfirm alliances.23 Formal contracts would be 
relatively unimportant, “... the significance of trust and reciprocity norms appear to 
reflect the reality of economic exchange: it takes place within and is shaped by social 
controls.” (1992, 98) Note, however, that his analysis showed also a high failure rate of 
alliances. Larson finds: “Critical to the developm nt of network forms is the history of 
prior personal relations and reputational knowledge that provides a receptive context for 
the initiation and evoluti n of economic exchange.” (1992, 99) The concept of trust, as 
used by Powell and Larson, seems to be what Williamson (1996, 256) calls “calculative 
trust”, which is best described in calculative terms. It is imaginable both in an embedded 
bilateral relationship as well as in an “un-embedded” one.  
Sociologists’ attack on TCE: Attempt of a summary 
Most of sociologists’ attack on TCE consists of questioning the realism of the 
assumptions of Williamson’s hypothesis. They say, not transaction costs are much of an 
issue but power, trust, embeddedness, social relationship, networks or other sociological 
concepts. But hypotheses are never descriptively “realistic” in their assumptions. Milton 
Friedman pointed that out and adds, what is important is that they are sufficiently good 
approximations  
“… for the purpose in hand. And this can be answered only by seeing whether the theory works, which 
means whether it yields sufficiently accurate predictions.”(Friedman 1953, 15) 
Important is the conformity to experience of the implications of TCE, the ex ante 
                                          
23 The industries were telephone equipment, clothing omputer hardware, and environmental support 
systems. (Larson 1992, 80) 
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protection against ex post opportunism, not whether business men do or do not actually 
reach their decisions by calculating the transaction costs of alternative governance 
structures. Testing of TCE has made considerable progress since 1975. Thus, Shelanski 
and Klein (1995) survey and assess some one hundred references on empirical research 
supporting TCE published prior to 1993.24 Williamson (1984, 85) rightly asks: “What are 
the deeper insights [of sociologists’ arguments]? What are the added implications? Are 
the effects in question really byond the reach of economizing reasoning?”  
Somewhat peculiar is that sociologists work off Williamson’s e rly markets and 
hierarchies hypothesis when there have been significant developments in TCE in the 
twenty or more years thereafter, some of which are responsive to the criticisms in 
question.25  
What seems to remain a problem for sociologists, including economic sociologists, is the 
rational choice tendency of TCE. Sociologists criticize that economists attribute human 
interaction to individual rationality and are abstracting away from fundamental aspects of 
social relationships that characterize economic as well as other actions. (Granovetter 
2001 as opposed to Williamson 1996, Ch. 10) Social phenomena like fairness, trust or 
power are reduced by economists to individual rational actions while they are, in fact, 
well beyond what individuals’ incentives can explai . Or, as Swedberg in a personal 
reaction to this paper remarks: “Quite a bit in business may be due to sociality, friendship 
and the like, which can be expressed in terms of [transaction] costs - but which the 
participants would not do so themselves.” Economists’ reply is that an “as if assumption” 
                                          
24 See also the collection of  by now classical applications and testings of TCE in  Williamson and Masten 
(1995). 
25 See, e.g., Williamson (1996) as quoted in this contribution. 
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suffices as long as the concept yields sufficiently accurate predictions 26 and, further, that 
economists view costs, including transaction costs, to be opportunity costs containing 
quite a pinch of subjectiv  evaluation.27  
One reply to the criticism of Williamson’s abstraction from the embeddedness of 
individuals in network relationships is to try to blend the two views. 
5. Blending TCE and Social Network Theory 
The network concept: Social networks consist of actors, attributes of actors and relations 
between pairs of actors (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Individual attributes include 
individual preferences, the type of choice behavior, the control of resources. The relations 
(or links) between pairs of actors may be understood as transactions (interactions), they 
are directed or controlled by an institution (J. Knight 1993, 2) or governance structure 
(Williamson 1985) – a set of explicit (formal) or implicit (informal) rules or norms, 
which structures social rel tions in a particular way. “Transactions” are to be understood 
sensu largo, not only as exchanges of material resources or information between actors 
but as any kind of social action “that establishes a linkage between a pair of actors.” 
(Wasserman and Faust 1994, 18) They include such “non-eco mic” relations or links as 
associations or affiliations between actors; movements between places; physical 
connections (a road, a telephone line); legal relationships (the formal debtor/creditor 
relation); biological relationships (kinship, descent); mental relationships (common 
views, beliefs, convictions, “culture”), and so on. Typical “economic” links between 
actors are relationships over time such as standing contracts, streams of transactions in 
                                          
26 See above Friedman (1953, 15) and his remarks on the lengthy discussion on the shortcomings of 
marginal analysis in the Am rican Economic Review 1946 –48. 
27 Cf., e.g., Alchian 1977, 301.
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markets, formal or informal authority relationships within a firm. 
Network relations raise issues foreign to pure dyadic relations, such as the “centrality” or 
“prestige” of actors, their “social position”, their “social role.” (Wasserman and Faust 
1994) In social networks actors compete for their social position. Thus, competition may 
be interpreted as competing for social positioning, as in Burt (1992).28 Positioning of 
selers or buyers in a network of market relationships is a matter of strategic significance. 
A new actor entering an already existing network, e.g., an existing market or firm, faces 
the challenge of positioning himself among the already existing actors and to build links 
with them, which may be tight or loose, “depending on the quantity (number) or quality 
(intensity), and type (closeness to the core activity of the parties involved) of interaction 
between members.” (Thorelli 1986, 38). “Social structure” is character zed by the 
strength of the links between actors. Embeddedness as described by Granovett r (1985) 
or Uzzi (1996) is a form of social network relationships. 
By blending TCE and social network theory we continue to assume, as in TCE, 
boundedly rational behavior of actors. This view is comparable with Granovetter’s 
concept of embeddedness, in spite of Uzzi (1996) who argues  
“ … that embeddedness shifts actors’ motivations away from narrow pursuit of immediate 
economic gains toward the enrichment of relationships through trust and reciprocity.” (Uzzi 1996, 
677).  
“Trust” is here apparently understood as a basic motive of economic action besides self-
interest (see above n. 6). But Uzzi’s statement would also be compatible with long term 
individual utility maximization as assumed to underlie any long term bilateral business 
                                          
28 Burt criticizes Williamson (1975) but disregards Williamson’s fundamental transformation concept (238 
ff.). 
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relationship or “relational contract,” the third organizational mode besides “market” and 
“hierarchie” in Williamson (1985). It is difficult to escape the all-embracing concept of 
individual utility. 
Network asset specificity: “Asset specificity29 is one reason why firms are dependent o  
external resources and devote important resources to investments in [inter firm] 
relationships.” (Johannson and Mattson 1987, 45) The same can be said for customer 
relationships between firms and households; in fact, it is true for any social relationship. 
Thus, Williamson’s fundamental transformation, resulting from transaction-specific 
investments, can be also applied to social networks. Actors have to pay an “entry fee” for 
becoming members of an existing network or have to invest in the establishment of a new 
one. Afterwards they are locked into a complex, multilateral relationship. The strength of 
their “locks” is expressed by the size of witching costs30. The lock-up can invite 
opportunistic behavior among actors. Court ordering is limited or impossible for reasons 
of transaction costs and has to be supplemented with or replaced by self- nforcement or 
private ordering. The governance structure of network relationships matters. As in 
Williamson’s dyadic relations, hierarchy is a possible governance structure also of 
networks, but works also without integration into a single firm (without “unified 
governance”). Hamilton and Feenstra report on network hierarchies, like vertically 
controlled business groups or horizontally controlled stock markets (Hamilton and 
Feenstra 1995, 643 ff.), Greif (1993) describes the social control of the network of the 
11th century Maghribi traders. Thi d party control (“trilateral governance”) is another 
governance structure of networks, introduced by Williamson himself with is argument 
                                          
29 Williamson (1985, 128). 
30 Shapiro and Varian (1999, 11 f.).
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in favor of public regulation in case of a single supplier of a network product like water, 
gas, telephone, cable television (Williamson 1976). It is justified as a method to limit ex-
post opportunism of the monopolist supplier.31 Third party control characterizes also the 
network of the law merchants at the medieval Champaign fairs (Milgrom, North and 
Weingast 1990) or of New York’s diamond dealers (Bernstein 1992). Positioning of 
actors in a network is a specific network safeguard against ex post opportunism. Thus, a 
buyer may establish a second source of supply to which he can easily switch, called 
“partial switching.” (Shapiro and Varian 1999, 140).  
Discussion: TCE and social network analysis can be meaningfully combined even if one 
assumes, as Uzzi (1996) seems to do, a different (or more general?) basic motivation of 
individual actors.32 In any case, trust and reciprocity are also justifiable in the more 
narrow sense of individual rational action. In this respect, the concept of Williamson’s 
fundamental transformation would also be applicable to network relationships. Of course, 
the governance structures of networks would have to be extended by network 
characteristics. Trust plays a more important role in networks than in dyadic relations, 
also egoism remains the basic motive of traders, because breach of promise is now 
punishable by third parties. Of interest in networks is also an actor’s strategic positioning 
and the techniques of collective ation such as coalition formation. “Voice” turns out to 
be an important organizational tool in addition to “exit”.33 Cooperation between actors 
may be supported by the most prestigious (or powerful) actor of the social network in 
form of hegemonic cooperation, e.g., of sovereign states. (Keohane 1984, 46) The 
                                          
31 Williamson (1976) illustrates his point by the experiences from the Oakland CATV franchise 1969-70. 
32 As alluded to by Schmoller (1900) or North (1990), see above n. 6. Interesting in this context is Frey’s 
(1997, 5ff.) concept of the homo oeconomicus matures, being controlled by extrinsic a d ntrinsic 
motivations.  
33 Using the terminology of Hirschman (1969). 
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foundation of international regimes like the United Nations, the European Economic 
Union etc. facilitate such hegemonic cooperation. The same concept could be applied to 
the social network of a natio  state or of a firm. An instrument against ex post 
opportunistic behavior of the nework’s hegemon is the use of voice. The government of 
a democratic state or the management of a modern corporation is subject to the credible 
threat of the “termination of relations” by their principals - their voters or shareholders.  
Specific investments in networks are a form of network capital. Its consideration is 
particularly important when dealing with economic transformation or development 
issues. The point is stressed by Stark (1996, 995) who argues that transformation of 
postsocialist economies should consist in “rebuilding organizations and institutions not 
on the ruins but with the ruins of communism ...”. An extreme counter example provides 
the German reunification of October 3, 1990. It was probably the most rapid f rmal 
transformation from socialism to capitalism in the world. East Germany took on, virtually 
overnight, the West German currency, the West German constitution, its legislation, 
administrative rules, economic order, social policy etc. Public administrations, courts, 
universities were turned upside down and newly staffed, to a large degree with West 
German experts. This complete disregard of path dependency of organizational change 
turned out to be an enormous handicap for the East German social and economic 
reconstruction. It would have been better (and probably less expensive) to consider the 
restrictions of path dependency. Still, as we know, path dependency may be also in the 
way of efficiency. Another handicap for a quick wirtschaftswunder style transformation 
of the East German economy might be made clear by the cultural vi w of organizations 
mentioned by Hamilton and Biggart (1988/1992, 182). The melancholic memory of the 
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“good old days” in the communist German Democratic Republic – “GDR nostalgia” – is 
a not to be ignored mentality of todays East Germans. As Berger and Luckman (1966, 54) 
rightly point out: 
“Institutions ... imply historicity and control. Reciprocal typifications of actions are built up in the 
course of a shared history. They cannot be created instantaneously. Institutions always have a history 
of which they are the products.”  
 
6. Concluding Thoughts  
No question, NES and NIE have a common object: social action. Both deal with social 
structures or organizations (“institutions”). Where most of them still differ are their 
models of man: various motives of human actions (includi g rational choice) on the one 
side, individual rationality (pure or bounded) on the other. Network imagery might bring 
TCE, and NIE in general, further towards NES. Because of the now widely accepted 
influence of transaction costs even the strictest neoclassical conomist should accept 
today the idea of a market as a network of people, knowing each other personally, as 
something “good” and not necessarily “b d” (encouraging collusi n instead of 
competition). The basic difference in the models of man of NES and NIE might shrink 
further, or even fully disappear, with future advancements in the biology of human social 
behavior (Robson 2001).34 For the time being, why not use different paradigms? The days 
are gone, when economists worked towards an elegant Gen ral Theory – as, e.g., general 
equilibrium theory or the neoclassical synthesis of Keynesian macroeconomics. 
                                          
34 In fact, economists are taking on further sociological issues like power (Rajan and Zingales 1998), 
fairness (Fehr, Klein and Schmidt 2001) social networks (Kranton and Minehart 2000), altruism 
(Bergstrom 1995) or status (Postlewaite 1998). There is also an increasing literature on preferences hat
adapt to experience (cf. Robson 2001, 17 ff.). 
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Macroeconomics, and increasingly also microeconomics, became a rag rug of different 
concepts explaining different phenomena. NIE with its many branches is a model for this 
development. In the course of time NES and NIE may merge into some “NSE” (New 
Socio-Economics). Presently, the two approaches, with their different models of man, 
may be used as special magnifying glasses for the analysis of different sets of problems. 
Plurality of methods has its explanatory merits. What seems indisp nsable, though, is to 
enrich economic institutional analysis with ociological or historical insights like the role 
of path dependency, of power (including the threat or use of force), of culture or fairness . 
The consequences of the elementary mistakes made by economists by advising politicians 
on development and transformation policy issues should make us think. 
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